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Abstract
While linkages between some macroeconomic phenomena and suicides in some countries
have been explored, only two studies, hitherto, have established a causal relationship between
fiscal austerity and suicide, albeit in a single country. The aim of this study is to provide the
first systematic multiple–country evidence of a causal relationship of fiscal austerity on time–,
gender–, and age–specific suicide mortality across five Eurozone peripheral countries, namely
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain over the period 1968–2012, while controlling for
various socioeconomic differences. The impact of fiscal adjustments is found to be gender–
, age– and time–specific. Specifically, fiscal austerity has short–, medium– and long–run
suicide increasing effects on the male population in the 65–89 age group. A 1% reduction in
government spending is associated with an 1.38%, 2.42% and 3.32% increase in the short–
, medium– and long–run, respectively, of male suicides rates in the 65–89 age group in
the Eurozone periphery. These results are highly robust to alternative measures of fiscal
austerity. Improved labour market institutions help mitigate the negative effects of fiscal
austerity on suicide mortality.
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1 Introduction
Although fiscal austerity is widely discussed in the economic literature, much less has been
published in terms of empirical evidence documenting its impact on suicide mortality. Some
headway in filling this gap has been made in recent years, with studies focusing on descriptive
or correlation analyses (see, for instance, Kentikelenis et al., 2011; Economou et al., 2011; Ken-
tikelenis et al., 2012; Fountoulakis et al., 2012; Karanikolos et al., 2013) and on single country
time series (Antonakakis and Collins, 2014; Branas et al., 2015). In this study, we report the first
systematic multiple-country evidence of a relationship between fiscal austerity and suicide mor-
tality, basing our analysis on a Eurozone periphery panel dataset, thereby covering a large share
of countries that have recently implemented fiscal austerity in an attempt to restore confidence,
competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability.
According to Lawson et al. (2014), the key drivers of population health lie outside the health
sector. Despite that, the authors argue that, decision makers outside the health sector seem
primarily interested in delivering sector specific outputs other than health. Thus, economic
approaches to priority setting can help align sectors to consider the intersectoral impacts of
decisions within an integrated societal framework.
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, many European countries, especially in the Eu-
rozone periphery, experienced an increase in their budget deficits and government debts in late
2009. That raised fears about a chain reaction of sovereign defaults on the Eurozone peripheral
countries’ debt, and possible contagion to other core Eurozone countries. This led to a crisis of
confidence and a widening of bond yield spreads and credit default swaps between the Eurozone
peripheral countries and the Eurozone’s largest economy, Germany. These developments have
ultimately initiated a European sovereign debt crisis that has resulted in large financial interven-
tions by individual governments and the ‘Troika’ (consisting of the European Commission (EC),
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the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) in the Euro-
zone peripheral countries. These policy interventions occurred in an attempt to avert potential
bankruptcies of highly indebted countries in the Eurozone periphery, potential contagion and
ultimately the collapse of the Eurozone itself. In particular, fiscal austerity packages consisted
of bailout packages to Eurozone peripheral countries that were accompanied by draconian and
unprecedented fiscal adjustment measures. These consisted of large spending cuts, tax hikes,
large privatisation schemes of publicly owned assets (with often largely overoptimistic initial sale
values) and structural reforms, so as to restore competitiveness, achieve fiscal sustainability and
promote growth.
Eventually, as business cycle theory suggests, every crisis comes to an end, and a ‘good’
policy is marked by its success in making the downturn of the business cycle shallower and
shorter than it otherwise would have been. The controversy associated with austerity policies
that many governments adopted relates to whether they made the downturn far deeper and
longer than was necessary, with long-lasting consequences not only for wealth, but also for
health. Thus a natural and important question is whether fiscal austerity will hurt economic
performance and health conditions over time.
In terms of the economic consequences, conventional wisdom suggests that reduction of debt
into sustainable levels has long–run benefits. For a recent detailed discussion of the macroe-
conomic effects of fiscal policy, see Afonso and Sousa (2012). However, there is no consensus
reached yet on the short–run, or even the medium–run effects of fiscal consolidation/austerity.
Keynesian economists might suggest that spending cuts and tax hikes will reduce economic ac-
tivity in the short–run (see, for instance, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). On the other hand, some
economists argue that fiscal consolidation/austerity may be expansionary even in the short–run,
which is referred to as “expansionary fiscal contraction” (see, for instance, Giavazzi and Pagano,
1990; Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; Giudice et al., 2004; Afonso, 2010;
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Alesina and Ardagna, 2010; Alesina, 2010). The success or failure of fiscal consolidation de-
pends on many factors, among which, its reliability on tax hikes primarily, the perceived risk
of sovereign default, the number of countries that simultaneously apply such measures, and
whether monetary policy is in position to offset budget cuts. For a discussion of these factors,
see IMF (2010). Quite recently, the fairness of fiscal consolidation has entered the pool of these
factors (Kaplanoglou et al., 2014).
Increasingly, the pursuit of fiscal austerity is being recognized by some as ineffective and
prolonging the economic crisis unnecessarily (IMF, 2013). This is because any reduction in the
fiscal deficit hurts the economy –at least in the short- to medium-term–, as it denotes that the
government sector has a less positive contribution to the economy, which is compounded when
the government is running a deficit. In light of Figure 1, the Eurozone debt crisis and the subse-
quent fiscal austerity may be considered to have led to a dramatic increase in government debts
and deficits, deep recessions and skyrocketing unemployment rates in the Eurozone periphery
since 2009. In particular, between 2009 and 2013, unemployment rates in Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain increased by 186.5% (from 9.6% to 27.5%), 9.2% (from 12% to 13.1%),
56.4% (from 7.8% to 12.2%), 54.7% (from 10.6% to 16.4%) and 45.8% (from 17.9% to 26.1%),
respectively. Youth unemployment in the respective countries over that period increased by
126.8% (from 25.7% to 58.3%), 11.7% (from 24.7% to 26.8%), 57.5% (from 25.4% to 40%),
51.8% (from 25.1% to 38.1%) and 47.2% (from 37.7% to 55.5%). These figures are well above
the Eurozone average increase of 26.3% (from 9.5% to 12%) and 18.8% (from 20.2% to 24%)
in overall unemployment rates and youth unemployment rates, respectively. There is a well
established link between unemployment and suicide, which tends to increase during economic
downturns, particularly where it is not offset by welfare safety nets. For a more comprehensive
list of suicide mortality determinants, see Chen et al. (2012). Moreover, the literature suggests
that periods of high unemployment rates are positively associated with incidence rates of ab-
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sence due to symptoms of illness and violent acts (see, e.g., Shoss and Penney, 2012). According
to the International Labour Organization (ILO), labour market conditions in the Eurozone have
worsened (and are projected to continue to this course) due to fiscal austerity, constituting to
the increase of unemployment rates (ILO, 2014) in the EU. In particular, the study of ILO
(2014), argues that the current fiscal austerity measures and the cuts in government spending
have heavily affected the funds available for social programmes for the most vulnerable groups
of women. In 2013, 45.2 million people where unemployed in the EU and it was forecasted
that the unemployment rate will gradually decline from 8.6% to 8% between 2013 and 2018,
albeit, significantly above that in 2008 (ILO, 2014). Real GDP per capita between 2009 and
2013 has seen a cumulative decline of 22.3% in Greece, 0.74% in Ireland, 3.11% in Italy, 2.84%
in Portugal, and 2.92% in Spain as compared to the cumulative increase of 0.94% in the whole
Eurozone according to Figure 1. Finally, government debt as a percentage of GDP between
the same period increased by 35.0% (from 129.7% to 157.1%), 92.1% (from 64.4% to 123.7%),
13.9% (from 116.4% to 132.6%), 54.1% (from 83.7% to 129%) and 73.9% (from 54% to 93.9%),
in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, respectively, well above the Eurozone average
government debt to GDP of 92.6% in 2013.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
The effects of the economic crisis and the fiscal adjustments have to some limited extent
been considered for health in the Eurozone periphery. Preliminary evidence indicates that the
economic crisis and the implementation of austerity measures have worsened self-rated health
status as well as several other health indicators (Kentikelenis et al., 2011; Vandoros et al., 2013;
Zavras et al., 2013), increased the incident of mental disorders and alcohol abuse (Kentikelenis
et al., 2011; Gili et al., 2013; Roca et al., 2013) and led to HIV outbreaks (ECDC, 2012).
Evidence also suggests that the Eurozone debt crisis and the policy responses disproportionately
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affected vulnerable populations in society (see, e.g., Schaltegger and Weder, 2014, for the effects
of fiscal consolidation on income inequality). Despite countries’ attempts to make savings by
switching to generic drugs, the policies that have been implemented to shift costs from the state
to patients resulted in medicines growing less affordable and increasingly hard to access (Arie,
2013). Data, however, also suggest favourable health trends and a reduction of traffic deaths
fatalities in the general population during recessions (Stuckler et al., 2009). This is in line
with the literature that finds that work-related, and other types accidents (e.g. due to drinking
and driving behaviours) are likely to become more common during temporary expansions of
economic activity (see, for instance, Evans and Graham, 1988; Ruhm, 1995). Dolan et al.
(2014), however, finds that road traffic accidents increased substantially in Greece on the first
two days following the announcements of austerity measures. Moreover, egalitarian policies
protecting the most disadvantaged populations with strong social protection have proved to be
effective in decoupling the link between job losses and suicides (De Vogli, 2014).
Yet, the health effects of fiscal austerity have been shown to have not been assessed con-
sistently (see, for instance, Webb and Kapur, 2015). Empirically robust evidence on the link
between fiscal austerity and suicide mortality has only been establish in Greece by Antonakakis
and Collins (2014) and Branas et al. (2015), or via descriptive and/or correlation analyses in
Greece and other Eurozone peripheral countries (see, for instance, Kentikelenis et al., 2011;
Economou et al., 2011; Kentikelenis et al., 2012; Fountoulakis et al., 2012; Karanikolos et al.,
2013).
To address this gap in the literature, we specifically investigate the effects of fiscal auster-
ity, among other socio-economic control variables, on suicide rates in all Eurozone peripheral
countries, namely, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain over the period 1968-2012. Our
empirical findings suggest that fiscal austerity, higher unemployment rates, negative economic
growth and reduced fertility rates lead to signicant increases on overall suicide rates in the Eu-
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rozone periphery. The effects of fiscal austerity are gender, age and time specific, with fiscal
austerity having short-, medium- and long-run suicide-increasing effects on the male population
between 65 and 89 years of age. In particular, a 1% reduction in government spending leads
to an 1.38%, 2.42% and 3.32% increase in the short-, medium- and long-run, respectively, of
male suicides rates between 65 and 89 years of age in the Eurozone periphery. In addition,
unemployment benefits and substantial employment protection legislation can help mitigate the
negative effects of fiscal austerity on suicide mortality.
These results have potentially important implications for policy makers across Europe. Eco-
nomic and financial issues have been dominating policy making in the Eurozone, while health
and inequalities in health have arguably remained relatively low key. Given that economic and
social policy decisions have profound effects for health and its fair distribution, health equity
should perhaps be considered an important measure of the effectiveness of social and economic
policy making, in addition to wealth equity (see, for instance, Marmot, 2012).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some brief remarks
on the extant theory relating to suicide, outlines the sources of our theoretical expectations and
sets out our key research hypotheses. Section 3, specifies the empirical methodology and the
data used. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 summarises and offers some
concluding remarks.
2 Key Hypotheses
Numerous studies have explored the impact of various macroeconomic phenomena on reported
subjective wellbeing (Di Tella et al., 2001, 2003; Alesina et al., 2004) typically presenting in-
tuitively plausible results. Suicide, however, serves as a very clear revealed objective measure
of substantial life dissatisfaction and as a potential indicator of wider mental health issues and
wellbeing issues in a given economy. It has long been the subject of theoretical and empirical
7
scrutiny. Durkheim (1897) and other sociologists in their wake have posited a positive rela-
tionship between suicide and age premised on the level of both social integration and social
regulation in a given society. Economists too have entered the arena led by Hamermesh and
Soss (1974) who advanced a rationality driven model of suicide founded on an assessment of the
likely expected cumulative lifetime utility.
Hamermesh and Soss (1974) posit a positive relationship between suicide rates and age,
and an inverse relationship with permanent income which can be expected to boost expected
cumulative lifetime satisfaction. The authors have empirically presented that these predictions
hold over time and across US states. Based on the extensive and very comprehensive review of
studies presented in Chen et al. (2012), this study extracts a full set of a priori expectations for
the macroeconomic performance and socio–demographic control variables based on the consensus
readily discernible in the literature. For a comprehensive list of suicide determinants see Chen
et al. (2012). These are set out in Table 1. However, in the context of fiscal austerity (specifically
public expenditure reductions) we posit the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : Fiscal austerity will increase suicide rates, via permanent income reductions.
Hypothesis 2 : Fiscal austerity impacts significantly differently across age cohorts. Specifically,
older age cohorts are more likely to commit suicide as a consequence of fiscal austerity than
younger age cohorts, given reliance on fixed incomes.
Hypothesis 3 : Fiscal austerity effects on suicide rates have both contemporaneous and lagged
effects.
Hypothesis 4 : Fiscal austerity effects on suicide rates are dampened by better labour market
institutions (e.g. unemployment benefits and employment protection legislation).
8
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
To conduct our analysis, we collect annual observations of suicide statistics for Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain between 1968 and 2012. Suicide data (defined as number of deaths
by suicide and self-inflicted injury/intentional self-harm, based on the following international
classification of diseases (ICD) codes, ICD-7 codes E963 and E970-E979, ICD-8 and ICD-9
codes E950-E959, ICD-10 codes X60-X84) and population data are extracted from the World
Health Organization (WHO) Mortality Database and are extended up to 2012 with data on
suicide and population supplemented from the official national statistics of each country and
Eurostat, respectively. A snapshot of these series is presented in Panel A of Table A.2 in the
Appendix.
Based on the above data, we convert the number of suicides to suicide rates per 100,000
inhabitants, broken down by age and gender in each country using the WHO standard procedure
(e.g., see Ahmad et al., 2012). Selected years for these series reported in Panel B of Table A.2 in
the Appendix, reveal similar trends as those for the number of suicides in Panel A of the same
table. The evolution of unemployment rates together with suicide rates, which is presented in
Figure 2, is quite revealing. It indicates that suicide mortality is gender and country specific,
indicating the necessity to take into account the gender heteogeneity and control for country-
specific effects in the empirical analysis.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
In Figure 3 which plots the Eurozone 5 peripheral countries’ average suicide rates by age
group and gender, reinforces the aforementioned age and gender heterogeneity. Nevertheless, it
is also depicts a positive trend of suicide rates overtime, which is more pronounced in the male
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population. This indicates the necessity to control for Eurozone periphery-wide time-effects in
the analysis.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
In order to examine the effects of fiscal austerity on suicide rates, we use several variables
as proxies of fiscal austerity. Given the large scale reductions in public sector salaries and pen-
sions in the Eurozone peripheral countries, our principal proxy of fiscal austerity is government
expenditure. We collect data for general government final consumption expenditure as a % of
GDP from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Given that this
measure might produce biased results during period when nominal GDP is falling, such as the
period of the financial crisis, we have explored the robustness of our results by dividing general
government final consumption expenditure by real GDP or by population. Our results, which are
available upon request, remain qualitatively and quantitatively almost identical. This is due to
the fact that the correlation between the three alternative measures is very high, namely 0.7521
and 0.7465, respectively. For robustness purposes we also use a fiscal consolidation episodes
indicator (FCE) based on Afonso (2010), the budget deficit, taxes, and government spending on
public health as proxies of fiscal austerity (see below). In addition, we collect data on per capita
real GDP growth from WDI so as to examine the cyclical nature of suicide mortality. Finally, to
control for social and demographic factors on suicide rates and to minimize errors arising from
unobserved effects, we collect data for fertility rates from the World Bank World Development
Indicators (WDI) database and Eurostat; alcohol consumption from OECD Health database
and divorce rates from EUROSTAT. Our panel dataset is unbalanced (please see Table A.1 for
data availability. Definitions, expected signs and descriptive statistics for all these variables are
included in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
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In Figure 4 we present the evolution of some of the macroeconomic series over the period
1968-2012 that are used in this study. According to this figure, economic growth, budget deficit
and public debt deteriorated since 2009, while government expenditure was severely cut since
2009 in the Eurozone periphery.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
3.2 Empirical Methodology
We estimate variants of the following specification:
Sijkt = α+ Sijkt−1β1 + Fitβ2 + Fit−1β3 + Eitλ+Ditµ+ γi + δt + εit (1)
where Sijkt is the log of suicide rates in country i (where i = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain), population j (where j = overall, male, female), age group k (where k = all, 10–24,
25–44, 45–64, 65–89) and time t (where t = 1968,...,2012); α is a constant; Sijkt−1 is the
first lag of Sijkt and is included to account for dynamic effects and to filter autocorrelation of
order one, AR(1), found in the series. Given that the lagged dependent variable, Sijkt−1, is
correlated with the fixed effects, this gives rise to ’dynamic panel bias’ (Nickell, 1981), which
inflates the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable by attributing predictive power to it that
actually belongs to the country’s fixed effect. According to Judson and Owen (1999) the so-called
least-squares dummy-variables (LSDV) estimator bias is present for panels with small time, T ,
dimension. A potential solution to this bias (and to potential endogeneity of other right-hand
side variables), is to use a generalised method of moments (GMM) approach, e.g. system-
GMM. However, this approach is designed for small time, T , dimension and large individual, N ,
dimension panels (for a discussion, see Roodman, 2009). An even more appropriate solution to
the aforementioned bias is to use the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (BCLSDV)
estimator of Bruno (2005a,b) that is suitable for dynamic unbalanced panels. Given the fact
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that: i) our panel is unbalanced and consists of large T (≈ 44) and small N(= 5), and ii) as Bruno
(2005a,b) show that, based on Monte Carlo analysis, the BCLSDV estimator performs better
than the original LSDV estimator and three popular N-consistent estimators: Arellano-Bond,
Anderson-Hsiao and Blundell-Bond when the panel is unbalnced, we thus employ the BCLSDV
estimator. However, all of our results using the LSDV estimator (that are presented in the paper)
are similar to those obtained using the (one-step or two-step) system-GMM estimator (that
is robust to substantial heteroskedasticity) derived by Arellano and Bond (1991), and further
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995). Moreover, our results are
very robust to alternative estimators that account for first-order autoregressive, heteroscedastic
and/or autocorrelated disturbances. The latter results are available upon request. Eit is a vector
of economic characteristics affecting suicide rates, such as the growth rate of real GDP, Growthit,
and the unemployment rate, Unempit; Fit is the fiscal consolidation variable proxied by either:
(i) the first difference of the natural logarithm of government expenditure as a % of GDP,
Gov Expit, or (ii) the first difference of budget deficit as a % of GDP, Defit, or (iii) government
tax revenues as a % of GDP, Taxit, or iv) fiscal consolidation episodes (FCE) indicator based on
Afonso (2010), or v) real per capita government spending on public health Pub Health Expit.
We also include a one period lag of the fiscal consolidation/austerity variable, Fit−1, so as to
control for any time delayed effects of fiscal consolidation/austerity on suicide mortality. Dit
is a vector of demographic and social characteristics affecting suicide rates, such as alcohol
consumption, Alcit, divorce rate, Divorceit and fertility rate, Fertit. γi denotes country fixed–
effects controlling for time–invariant country characteristics, and δt denotes time fixed–effects,
controlling for Eurozone periphery country–invariant time characteristics. The fixed–effects
estimates are used to exploit within–country variations in economic conditions and have the
potential to improve on time series analyses if there are substantial independent socio-economic
fluctuations across countries over time. εit is the error term.
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The intuition for incorporating the range of right-hand side variables deployed in this study
follows the consensus evident in the recent literature surveyed by Chen et al. (2012). Andre´s
(2005) and Viren (2005) establish a significant linkage between economic growth and suicide.
Given positive economic growth enhances occupational and financial opportunities, people are
more likely to be hopeful decreasing the probability of suicide. In a similar vein, unemployment
serves as a predictor of future income and thus rising unemployment should be expected to
lead to an increasing incidence of suicide and suicide attempts. Further, suicide may also be
associated with a range of mental and physical illnesses that may raise the probability of suicidal
behaviour.
In the seminal work of Durkheim (1897) suicide mortality was postulated to be strongly
influenced by social regulations and its degree of integration. Arguably, divorce and fertility
rates may be presented as indicators of social integration. Durkheim specifically highlights
divorce as serving to reduce social integration and family ties resulting in stress, shame and
a greater disposition towards suicidality. Accordingly, higher divorce rates tends to be related
to higher suicide rates (see, for example Minoiu and Andres, 2008; Brainerd, 2001; Neumayer,
2003, among others).
Durkheim (1897) and Andre´s (2005) make the case for fertility rate to be viewed as an
indicator of social integration, suggesting high fertility rates are related to lower suicidality. The
absence of children is thus associated by them with greater fluidity in family integration and
social ties. Finally, Neumayer (2003) and Andre´s (2005) find that, individuals with a higher
alcohol consumption are more likely to commit suicide.
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4 Estimation Results
4.1 Baseline Results: Short-run Effects
In Tables 2, 3 and 4 we report the main results with particular focus onto the short–run effects
of fiscal austerity on the overall, male and female population, respectively, in the Eurozone
periphery.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
[Insert Table 3 around here]
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Turning to the results of Table 2, we observe that suicide rates are very persistent as the
coefficient of the one year lagged dependent variable has a statistically significant positive effect
on current suicide rates. Downturns of economic activity increase suicide rates across all ages.
This result is in line with Breuer (2014). For instance, one percentage point decline in a Eurozone
periphery country’s growth rate of real GDP per capita increases suicide rates of the population
across all ages by 0.9%, and of the population between 10 and 44, and 65 and 89 years of age
by around 1.3%. Moreover, the results of Table 2 suggest that increases in unemployment leads
to significant increases in overall suicides rates of 10–24 years of age, with a 1 percentage point
increase in a Eurozone periphery country’s unemployment rate leading to a 1.48% increase in
suicide rates in that age group. These results are in line with Breuer (2014) and Ruhm (2000).
Breuer (2014) finds that, for European regions, a 1 percentage point increase in a European
region’s unemployment rate is predicted to increase suicide rates of working age population by
about 0.87%, while the latter authors find that for the U.S., a 1 percentage point increase in
a state’s unemployment rate is predicted to increase overall suicide rates by about 1.3%. Our
results are also quite similar to Stuckler et al. (2009) who find that, for 26 European countries,
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a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with a 0.79% rise in suicide at ages
younger than 65 years. Unemployment is the leading cause of youth suicides in the Eurozone
periphery, and as youth unemployment has deteriorated substantially in the eurozone periphery
(see Figure 1), this is an alarming figure. Fertility rates are negatively related to suicide rates,
especially in the overall population between the ages of 10 and 24, 25 and 44, and 65 and 89 in
the Eurozone periphery.
Turning our attention to the impact of fiscal austerity on suicide rates, we find that, fiscal
austerity is also a significant predictor of suicide mortality, having both significant contempo-
raneous and lagged effects on suicide rates across various age groups. In particular, reductions
in government spending lead to contemporaneous increases in suicides rates in the population
group of 45-64 and, especially, in the 65-89 group, while with one year lag increases in suicide
rates in the population groups of 10-24, 25-44 and 65-89. For instance, for each 1% reduction in
a Eurozone periphery country’s government spending, the suicide rate of the population between
65 and 89 is predicted to rise by about 1.00% (-0.64% plus -0.36%) in the short-run. This seems
plausible, since the oldest age groups are naturally likely to be more inflexible following imple-
mentation of any fiscal austerity that would reduce their incomes (especially from pensions).
Younger segments of the population affected by fiscal austerity measures have a wider range of
perceived opportunities beyond suicide. Finally, alcohol consumption or divorce rates do not
exert any significant influence on suicide mortality in the overall population and across all ages
in the Eurozone periphery.
Moving to the results for the male population reported in Table 3, it may be observed that
they are similar to those for the overall population. In particular, government spending cuts,
negative economic growth, reduced fertility rates and, to a lesser extent, increased unemploy-
ment, have a significantly positive impact on male suicide rates. The male population group that
is most heavily affected by spending cuts is the one between the 65 and 89 years of age. In this
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group, a 1% reduction in a Eurozone periphery country’s government spending is significantly
associated with a contemporaneous and a year lag increase of 0.80% and 0.58%, respectively, in
male suicide rates. That is, for every 1% reduction in a Eurozone periphery country’s govern-
ment spending, the suicide rate of the male population between 65 and 89 is predicted to rise
by about 1.38% (= −0.80% plus −0.58%; column (10) of Table 3). Put differently, the short–
run impact or ‘health’ multiplier of fiscal austerity on male suicides in the 65-89 year group is
-1.38%. To put things into perspective, final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP
in the Eurozone periphery declined on average by 4.486% in t = 2011 (from 2010 to 2011) and by
4.137% percentage in t−1 = 2010 (from 2009 to 2010), resulting in a 11.901%(= 8.624%×1.38%)
increase in male suicide rates between 65 and 89 years in the Eurozone periphery on average in
2011. Given that the Eurozone periphery average male population in the 65-89 group in 2011
was 2,064,061, the 11.901% increase corresponds to 246 suicides in every Eurozone periphery
country on average in 2011 solely due to fiscal austerity. Following this approach, the number
of males in the 65-89 age group who committed suicide solely due to fiscal austerity in 2012
amounted to 219. Put differently, between 2011 and 2012, 465 males in the 65-89 age group
committed suicide in every Eurozone periphery country on average due to, ceteris paribus, fiscal
austerity; or 54.07% (= (465/(456 + 404)× 100)) of all the suicides recorded in every Eurozone
periphery country on average in 2011 and 2012, was due to fiscal consolidation/austerity. In
other words, 2325(= 5 × 465) males in the 65-89 age group committed suicide in the whole
Eurozone periphery between 2011 and 2012 due to fiscal austerity measures.
In contrast, fiscal austerity does not seem to have had any significant contemporaneous im-
pact on female suicide rates. However, there are suicide–increasing effects for female in the
25-44 age group with a year lag of the implementation of austerity. For every 1% reduction in
a Eurozone periphery country’s government spending, the suicide rate of the female population
between the ages of 25 and 44 is predicted to rise by 0.72%. The females in all the other age
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groups seem to be resilient to fiscal austerity. Fertility rates, divorce rates and alcohol consump-
tion are also significant predictors of female suicides. In particular, increases in fertility rates
(alcohol consumption) have significant suicide–reducing effects among the female population
between the ages of 45 and 89 (between the ages of 10 and 24, and 65 and 89), while increases
in divorce rates lead to a significant increase of female suicide rates between the ages of 45 and
89 years of age.
Overall, these results suggest that suicides rates in the Eurozone periphery are of a persistent
nature, and that the effects of economic growth, unemployment, spending cuts, fertility rates,
divorce rates and alcohol consumption on suicide mortality are age and gender specific. More
importantly, these results suggest that economic policies, such as fiscal austerity, can also have an
impact on suicide mortality, and potentially offer some guidance on the demographic targeting
of suicide prevention measures for the population of the debt-stricken economies in the Eurozone
periphery.
4.2 Medium- and Long-run Effects
So far, fiscal austerity has been assumed to have only a contemporaneous and a year lag effect,
i.e. short–run impact, on suicide mortality. In order to provide information on the potential
medium– and long–run effects of the fiscal adjustment process on suicide mortality, we: i) re–
estimate model (1) with the inclusion of five year lags of fiscal austerity as:
Sijkt = α+ Sijkt−1β1 + Fitβ2 + Fit−1β3 + ...+ Fit−5β7 + Eitλ+Ditµ+ γi + δt + εit (2)
and use the resulting estimates to summarize the predicted impact of a sustained 1% decline in
government expenditure that begins in year t and continues through t+ 5, in similar fashion as
in Ruhm (2000) (The choice of a five–year lag is based upon the fact that: a) the coefficient of
the sixth lag in the overall, male and female suicide mortality equation has a p-value greater
than 0.10, and b) given that fiscal austerity, at the time of the writing of this study, is pursued
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for the 5th consecutive year, it seems warranted to assess its medium term impact on suicide
mortality), and ii) calculate the long–run multiplier of fiscal austerity on suicide based on the
following equation:
βLR =
βˆ2 + βˆ3
1− βˆ1
, (3)
where βˆ1 denotes the estimated parameter of the lagged suicide rates from model 1, and βˆ2
and βˆ3 the estimated parameters of the contemporaneous and lagged fiscal austerity variables,
respectively, from model 1.
The results of the medium–run effects of fiscal austerity on suicides rates are reported in
Table 5, while the cumulative adjustment path of suicide rates is presented in Figure 5.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
According to Table 5 and Figure 5, we observe that, although that the time profile varies
with age and gender, a sustained cut in government spending is strongly associated with both
short-run and medium-run increases in suicide rates in the Eurozone periphery, lasting up to
five years following the application of fiscal austerity. However, this varies across gender and
age. In particular, persistent cuts in government spending significantly increase suicide rates of
males across all ages in the medium–run, while no significant medium–run effects on the female
population could be identified in the Eurozone periphery. The latter group seems to be resilient
to sustained budget cuts in the medium run, as only contemporaneous, one and two year lag
effects of budget cuts have a significant positive impact on female suicide mortality in the 65–89,
25–44 and 45–65 age groups, respectively, in the Eurozone periphery.
The age group most heavily affected by sustained budget cuts is the male population in the
65-89 age group, followed be males in the 25-44 age group. For instance, the expected bottom-line
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(medium-run) effect of a sustained 1% decline in a Eurozone periphery’s government spending,
according to Figure 5, is an increase of 2.42% (= 0.89% + 0.75% + 0.78%) in the suicide rates of
males in the 65-89 age group. Given that final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP
in the Eurozone periphery on average declined on average by 15.401% (which is derived as the
sum of the 4.137%, 4.486% and 3.102% decline in government spending as a % of GDP between
2009 and 2010, 2010 and 2011, and 2011 and 2012, respectively, and (based on updated data on
government spending as a % of GDP from the AMECO database) 0.179% increase in government
spending as a % of GDP between 2012 and 2013, and 3.854% decline in government spending
as a % of GDP between 2013 and 2014.) from 2009 to 2014 (i.e. in 5 years), the medium-run
effects of fiscal austerity translate to a 37.27% (=15.401%×2.42%) increase in male suicide rates
in every Eurozone periphery country on average due to sustained fiscal austerity. Based on data
for population projections from Eurostat (code: proj 13npms), the male population of 65-89
years in the Eurozone periphery on average is projected to be 2,444,577 in 2014, resulting in
911 predicted male suicides in every Eurozone periphery country on average due to sustained
fiscal austerity between 2009 and 2014. Put differently, 4556 male suicides between the ages of
65 and 89 are predicted to have been committed in the whole Eurozone periphery between 2009
and 2014 due to sustained fiscal austerity.
Apart from the short-run (impact multiplier) and the medium-run effects of fiscal austerity
on suicide rates obtained above, we can also compute the long–run multiplier of fiscal austerity
on suicides rates based on equation (3). This stems from the fact that results of fiscal austerity
and their associated repercussions could have long-lasting impacts on the mental health of the
most deprived sections of the population in the Eurozone periphery. According to Table 6,
the long–run multiplier of fiscal austerity on overall and male suicide rates of the population
between 65 and 89 years of age is −2.61%(= (−0.0064 − 0.0036)/(1 − 0.6172)) and −3.32%(=
(−0.0080−0.0058)/(1−0.5849)), respectively. That is, for every 1% cut in a Eurozone periphery’s
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government spending, the suicide rates of the male population between the 65 and 89 years of
age is predicted to rise by 3.32%. To put things into perspective, final consumption expenditure
as a percentage of GDP in a Eurozone periphery country on average declined by 8.624% (4.137%
in t − 1 = 2010 and 4.486% in t = 2011), resulting in a 28.63% (= 8.624% × 3.32%) long-run
increase in male suicide rates in the 65-89 age group because of fiscal austerity. Again, based on
population projections from Eurostat (code: proj 13npms), the male population of 65-89 years
in the Eurozone periphery on average is projected to be 2,355,280 in 2020 (2020 is considered as
the benchmark long-run run scenario, based on the fact that the Greek government is bound to
the Troika’s bailout scheme and the corresponding structural adjustments, at least, till 2020),
resulting in a 674 elderly male suicides in the long-run in every Eurozone periphery country
on average, or in 3370 elderly male suicides in the whole Eurozone periphery in the long run
as a result of fiscal austerity. This might, at first glance, seem contradictory to earlier results.
However, it can be readily explained by the fact that, in the long run, people will be able to
‘adjust’ to the situation more efficiently (e.g. via migration, or, given the life expectancy of this
age group, death, due to natural causes) compared to the short- or medium-run. In the short- or
medium-run, resources and flexibility are limited, leaving little or no space to manoeuvre. Yet,
the number of suicides associated with fiscal austerity is still very high, even in the long-run.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
Overall, these results suggest that the effects of fiscal austerity have long lasting effects on
suicide rates of the aforementioned parts of the population in the Eurozone periphery.
4.3 Robustness Analysis
4.3.1 Alternative Proxies of Fiscal Austerity
In this section we examine the robustness of our results by using alternative proxies of fiscal
austerity. In particular, we re-estimate model (1) four times, each of which with the following
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four alternative fiscal austerity proxies:
1. Budget deficit as a percentage of GDP. Specifically, we include the first difference of gov-
ernment budget deficit as a % of GDP, Defit.
2. A fiscal consolidation episodes (FCE) indicator based on Afonso (2010) defined as:
FCEit =

1, if ∆bit > γσ,
1, if
∑1
k=0 ∆bit−k/2 > σ,
0, otherwise,
(4)
where b is the primary structural budget balance in country i and time t, and σ is the stan-
dard deviation for the EU15 (specifically, σEU15 = 1.25) while γ is applied to determine
a multiple of the standard deviation. Using the first difference of the primary structural
budget balance as a % of GDP, ∆bit, also known as fiscal impulse, it allows us to correct
of the effects on budget balance from changes in economic activity such as inflation or real
interest rates. Following Afonso (2010) we use γ = 1.5. According to Afonso (2010), there
is an element of arbitrariness with the choice of γ. In this particular case, 1.5σ corresponds
to 1.875 percentage points of GDP, thus indicating a more demanding threshold to deter-
mine a fiscal episode. Hence, a fiscal consolidation episode occurs when either the change
in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at least one and a half times the standard
deviation in one year, or when the change in the primary cyclically adjusted balance is at
least one standard deviation on average in the last 2 years.
3. Government tax revenues expressed as a percentage of GDP, Taxit.
4. Real government per capita expenditure on public health, Pub Health Expit.
The results of this analysis are presented in Tables A.4 - A.15 in the Appendix.
According to these results, reductions in budget deficits have a significantly positive and
instantaneous impact on male suicides in the age group of 45-89, while a significantly positive
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but with a year lag on female suicides in the 65-89 age group in the Eurozone periphery. Based
on the fiscal consolidation episodes indicator as used in Afonso (2010), the results are quite
similar. In particular, suicide rates of males in the oldest groups significantly and contempo-
raneously increase following a fiscal consolidation episode. These results are in line with our
main findings, that fiscal consolidation mostly affects the elderly male population. Moreover,
higher tax revenues by governments in the Eurozone periphery significantly increase suicide
rates only of the male population between the ages of 25 and 44 within a year. There is also
a negative and contemporaneous effect of higher tax revenues on male suicide mortality in the
25–44 age group. However, the overall short–run effect of a one percentage point increase in
a Eurozone periphery’s taxes is an increase in males suicide rates in the 25–44 age group by
0.85%(= −1.48% + 2.33%); see column (6) in Table A.11. A potential explanation for this effect
is that, the 25-44 male age group of the population consists of potential entrepreneurs who are
thinking of starting a new (or already run a) business, but are strongly affected by their inabil-
ity to pay taxes, leading to business closures, income losses, depression and, eventually, suicide.
Finally, the coefficients of the remaining socio-economic determinants are in line with our main
findings. For instance, higher divorce rates and lower fertility rates significantly increase suicide
mortality mostly among both the male and female elderly population in the Eurozone periphery.
4.3.2 The Role of Labour Market Institutions
As a final robustness check, we explore whether labour market institutions have an influence
on job satisfaction and the quality of life (for a discussion, see e.g. McKee-Ryan et al., 2005),
and ultimately on suicide mortality. Breuer and Rottmann (2014) examine the effects of labour
market institutions, among other socio-economic factors, on suicide mortality in a panel of 25
OECD (advanced) countries, and find that unemployment benefits decrease male suicides, while
relatively strict employment protection regulations are positive related with suicide mortality of
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both genders.
Theoretically, this can occur in the following ways: (i) stricter labour market regulations and
higher unemployment benefits could help mitigate the negative effects of income loss of workers
in the case of unemployment during period of negative economic activity and (ii) they will be
comparable to a social security system for employees in a private market, acting as safety nets
in the risk of unemployment. For a detailed discussion on the potential channels, see Breuer
and Rottmann (2014).
To conduct this final robustness check, and following Breuer and Rottmann (2014), we collect
data for an indicator of employment protection legislation (EPL version EPRC V1) from OECD
database. The EPL (version EPRC V1) indicator is defined as an indicator of the strictness
of employment protection of regular workers against individual and collective dismissals, and
can be retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/qdf2zmu. This indicator is available between 1985
and 2013. There also exists another very closely related indicator of employment protection
legislation developed by Allard (2005) over the period 1950-2003. In fact the correlation between
the OECD EPL and the Allard (2005) indicators of employment protection legislation for the
overlapping periods (1985-2003) in the Eurozone periphery is very high, namely 0.992. Thus,
to increase the amount of observations and consequently predictive power of the results, we
obtain the annual growth rate of the Allard (2005) indicator from 1985 to 1968, and apply
it backwards to the OECD EPL indicator starting in 1984. Our indicator of unemployment
benefit is proxied by the gross replacement rate (GRR), which is defined as gross unemployment
benefit level as a percentage of previous gross earnings and obtained from OECD labour market
statistics database. The series can be retrieved from www.oecd.org/els/soc/GRR_EN.xlsx.
This indicator comes in two versions: (i) GRRAPW from 1961 to 2005 and (ii) GRRAW between
2001 and 2011. The former is calibrated to the average productive worker, while the latter is
calibrated to average worker. Both indicators are available in uneven years. We fill missing values
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for both series by linear interpolation and extend the GRRAPW indicator with the growth rate
of GRRAW from 2005 to 2011. Thus we end up with a combined indicator of unemployment
benefits between 1968 and 2011.
In Tables 7 - 9 we present the results with the aforementioned indicators of labour market
institutions. In particular, under columns (1), (3), (5), (7) and (9), we include the indicators for
employment protection and for gross replacement rate, and under columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and
(10), we also include their interaction with the fiscal austerity proxy so as to examine whether
these interactions affect the results. According to the results under columns (1), (3), (5), (7)
and (9), substantial employment protection legislation –especially that supporting older aged
segments of the population– and higher unemployment benefits for the 25–44 (65–89) age groups
of both sexes (males) have significantly suicide–reducing effects. The latter (former) result is
partially in line (contrasts) with those in Breuer and Rottmann (2014). For instance, in the
presence of improved labour market institutions and unemployment benefits, a one unit increase
in a Eurozone periphery country’s employment protection legislation indicator and gross replace-
ment ratio (i.e. unemployment benefits) indicator is predicted to decrease male suicide rates in
the age group of 65-89 by 5.18% and by 0.33%, respectively (see column (10) of Table 8), and
thus help mitigate the negative effects of fiscal austerity on suicide mortality. In particular, given
that the population of males in the age group of 65-89 in 2011 was, on average, 2,064,061 in the
Eurozone periphery, 107 and 7 suicides could have been avoided in a Eurozone periphery country
on average in 2011, due to more substantial employment protection legislation and improved
unemployment benefits, respectively. This corresponds to 570(= 535 + 35) suicides that could
have been avoided in the whole Eurozone periphery in 2011 as a consequence of improved labour
market institutions. However, in reality, the indicator of employment protection legislation and
unemployment benefits declined by 0.1556 and 1.0101 units, respectively, in 2011 (compared to
2010), thus leading to an increase in male suicides between 65 and 89 years of age by 0.81% and
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0.36%, respectively. In other words, 17 and 7 male suicides in the 65–89 age group occurred in
2011 in every Eurozone periphery country on average, or, 85(= 17×5) and 40(= 8×5) male sui-
cides in the 65-89 age group occurred in the whole Eurozone periphery, due to the deterioration
of employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits, respectively. Finally, under
columns (2), (4), (6), (8) and (10) in Tables 7 - 9, that present the results of the interaction
of labour market institutions with fiscal austerity (EPL ∗ Gov Expit and GRR ∗ Gov Expit),
we observe that only the interaction of fiscal austerity and employment protection legislation
is positively and statistically significant only for males in the 65–89 age group, indicating that
the observed decline in employment protection legislation combined with fiscal austerity led to
a significant increase in suicide rates in that group. Interestingly enough, once the interaction
is controlled for, the coefficients of fiscal austerity (Gov Expit and Gov Expit−1) become in-
significant indicating that the detrimental effects of austerity on suicide mortality of males in
the 65–89 age group in the Eurozone periphery could be mitigated with increased employment
protection legislation.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
[Insert Table 8 around here]
[Insert Table 9 around here]
Summing up, these results suggest that the negative effects of economic downturns and fiscal
austerity could be mitigated by the adoption of redistributive policies and by investing in some
specific elements of stronger social protection in the Eurozone periphery; and are in line with
Kaplanoglou et al. (2014) who find that, improving the targeting of social transfers and their
effectiveness in terms of poverty alleviation, higher public expenditure on training and active
labour market policies and programmes like social housing directed to the poor, even decreasing
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the VAT rate on necessities, improve the success probabilities of consolidation/austerity at-
tempts. Overall, these results have also important implications for policy makers in the domain
of economics and health across Europe. Economic and financial issues have been dominating
policy making in the Eurozone, while health and inequalities in health remaining relatively low
key in policy discussion. Given that economic and social policy decisions have profound ef-
fects on health and its fair distribution, health equity should be an important measure of the
effectiveness of social and economic policy making, in addition to wealth equity (Marmot, 2012).
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The 2008 global financial crisis that subsequently transformed to a fully-fledged Eurozone
sovereign debt in crisis in 2009, has clearly highlighted the health effects experienced by coun-
tries, such as the peripheral Eurozone countries, that have been heavily affected by soaring
unemployment, financial distress and slumps in economic activity. Unprecedented policy in-
terventions have been experienced in the peripheral debt-stricken Eurozone economies in an
attempt to restore confidence, competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability.
However, the timing, scope, size and necessity of the policy responses, comprising mainly
bank bailouts and austerity programmes, in most European countries still remains controversial,
and has led to concerns about their economic and health effects. Not only crises, but also
economic policy responses can lead to increased suicide mortality, widen inequalities in both
wealth and health, and undermine the social fabric of the society. Clearly, the Eurozone debt
crisis –especially in the peripheral Eurozone countries that have been heavily affected by the
crisis and the policy responses – is not over, and it seems to be transforming into a health crisis.
Prospects for economic and health recovery remain quite uncertain and fragile.
In this study, we explore the impact of fiscal austerity on suicide mortality across all Eurozone
peripheral economies, while controlling for various economic and socio-demographic differences.
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Based on several proxies of fiscal austerity and robustness checks, the empirical regularities of
this study reveal that the impact of fiscal adjustments is gender, age and time specific. In
particular, fiscal austerity has short-, medium- and long-run suicide increasing effects on the
male population between 65 and 89 years of age. A 1% reduction in a Eurozone periphery
country’s government spending leads to an increase of 1.38%, 2.42% and 3.32% in the short-,
medium- and long-run, respectively, of male suicides rates between 65 and 89 years of age in
the Eurozone periphery. In addition, unemployment benefits and strict employment protection
legislation can help mitigate the negative effects of fiscal austerity on suicide mortality.
These results have important implications for policy makers in the domain of economics and
health across Europe. Economic and financial issues have been dominating policy making in
the Eurozone, while health and inequalities in health remained relatively low key. Given that
economic and social policy decisions have profound effects for health and its fair distribution,
health equity should be an important measure of the effectiveness of social and economic policy
making, in addition to wealth equity.
The case is strong for governments, as well as European leaders and policy makers, who
arguably need to intervene more boldly to protect the most vulnerable and distressed populations
from the effects of the crisis and the subsequent fiscal consolidation/austerity measures. That
is, different policy sectors should be encouraged to consider and value all major intersectoral
impacts of economic policy to society as a whole, including health. For instance, by adopting
redistributive policies and by targeted investment in some particular aspects of social protection,
governments can promote sustainable health and minimize some of the negative effects of the
crisis and fiscal austerity on health. Highly targeted social welfare programmes could help
mitigate the health effects of some economic crises, including mental health problems due to
increased unemployment (e.g., Vinokur et al., 1991). Put differently, we advocate a paradigm
shift in political economy to set a new course of policy development where markets and profits
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are explicitly means to human ends and not the other way around. That is, placing health
before wealth.
A potential avenue for future research could be a longitudinal analysis of all Eurozone and/or
European Union countries, so as to examine whether the effects of fiscal austerity on suicide in
countries that did not apply fiscal austerity measures differ to those in countries that applied
such measures.
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Figure 1: Government debt, deficit, unemployment rate, and real GDP per capita (growth),
2007–2013
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Figure 2: Suicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants (%), by country, 1968–2012
 
0
2
4
6
8
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
overall male
female
Greece
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
overall male
female
Ireland
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
overall male
female
Italy
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
overall male
female
Portugal
0
5
1
0
1
5
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
overall male
female
Spain
Source: WHO.
37
Figure 3: Average suicide rates by age group and gender in the Eurozone periphery, 1968–2012
 
0
5
10
15
20
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Overall
All ages 10-24 years
25-44 years 45-64 years
65-89 years
year
0
10
20
30
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Male
All ages 10-24 years
25-44 years 45-64 years
65-89 years
year
0
5
10
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Female
All ages 10-24 years
25-44 years 45-64 years
65-89 years
year
Source: WHO.
38
Figure 4: Real per capita GDP growth, government expenditure, budget deficit and public debt,
1968–2012
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Figure 5: Cumulative effect of a sustained 1% reduction in Eurozone periphery government
spending on suicide rates
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Table 5: Medium-run predicted effect of a sustained 1% reduction in government spending
beginning in year t
Panel A: overall suicide rates
Age t t + 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
All ages 0.32% 0.33%** 0.30% -0.11% -0.06% 0.37%**
10–24 years -0.23% 0.63% -0.20% 0.72%* -0.63% 0.28%
25–44 years 0.10% 0.51%** 0.45%* -0.27% 0.21% 0.75%***
45–64 years 0.26% 0.07% 0.53%* -0.11% 0.09% 0.53%**
65–89 years 0.62%** 0.60%** -0.02% 0.54%* -0.14% -0.11%
Panel B: male suicide rates
Age t t + 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
All ages 0.41%* 0.33%* 0.21% -0.05% 0.09% 0.40%**
10–24 years 0.03% 0.78%* 0.12% 0.55% -0.73% 0.55%
25–44 years 0.16% 0.61%** 0.74%* -0.15% 0.28% 0.81%***
45–64 years 0.57%*** 0.05% 0.14%* -0.03% 0.42% 0.44%*
65–89 years 0.89%** 0.75%** 0.26% 0.78%** 0.19% 0.18%
Panel C: female suicide rates
Age t t + 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
All ages 0.19% 0.44%* 0.52% -0.28% -0.43% 0.15%
10–24 years -0.82% 0.52% 0.30% 0.08% 0.47% 0.49%
25–44 years 0.06% 0.88%* 0.71% -0.42% 0.12% 0.21%
45–64 years -0.09% 0.08% 1.26%** -0.03% -0.61% 0.58%
65–89 years 1.50%** 0.14% -0.78% 0.68% -0.16% -0.41%
Note: Entries show the predicted effect of a 1% decrease in the Eurozone periphery government spending beginning
in year t and continuing through year t + 5. These predictions are made using the results of regressions similar
to those in Tables 2, 3 and 4, with the only exception of the inclusion of fiscal austerity variable lagged up to 5
year periods. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
45
Table 6: Long–run multiplier of fiscal austerity on suicide rates
Overall suicide rates Male suicide rates Female suicide rates
All ages - - -
10–24 years - - -
25–44 years - - -
45–64 years - - -
65–89 years -2.61% -3.32% -
Note: The long–run multiplier is computed according to equation 3 only for the cases where all the coefficients
βˆ1, βˆ2 and βˆ3 are significant at least at the 10% level in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
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A Online Appendix
We collect annual observations of suicide statistics for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain
between 1968 and 2012. Suicide data (defined as number of deaths by suicide and self-inflicted
injury/intentional self-harm, based on the following international classification of diseases (ICD)
codes, ICD-7 codes E963 and E970-E979, ICD-8 and ICD-9 codes E950-E959, ICD-10 codes X60-
X84) and population data are extracted from the World Health Organization (WHO) Mortality
Database1 and are extended up to 2012 with data on suicide and population supplemented from
the official national statistics of each country2 and Eurostat3, respectively. There is a consensus
and some analytical concern that suicides are underreported in general due to misclassifications
(see e.g. Andriessen, 2006; Sainsbury and Jenkins, 1982). Despite this, the total epidemiological
picture seems to be reliable and international suicide rates can be compared over time and across
countries. Suicide data can have ‘a weak validity but an acceptable reliability’ (Andriessen,
2006). Therefore, our estimated parameters should be seen as an underestimation of the true
effects of fiscal austerity.
Overall unemployment rate data have been obtained from the Annual Macro-Economic
(AMECO) database of the European Commission4, while gender-specific unemployment rates
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database maintained by the World Bank5. The
general government final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP and taxes as a % of GDP,
along with per capita real GDP growth come from the World Bank World Development In-
dicators (WDI) database6 and the government budget deficit as a % of GDP comes from the
1http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/.
2Greece: http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/PAGE-database, Ireland: http://www.cso.
ie/en/index.html, Italy: http://en.istat.it/dati/db_siti/, Portugal: http://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?
xpgid=ine_main&xpid=INE&xlang=en, Spain: http://www.ine.es/en/welcome.shtml.
3http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Causes_of_death_statistics.
4http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm.
5http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS and http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS.
6http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOVT.ZS, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.
TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS and http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.
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AMECO database7. Data on fertility rates come from the World Bank World Development In-
dicators (WDI)8 and Eurostat databases9, alcohol consumption from OECD Health database10
and divorce rates from EUROSTAT11. Finally, data for the labour market institution indicators
comes from OECD labour market statistics database12 and Allard (2005).
Table A.1: Data availability
Variable Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Age and gender specific suicide rates 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2011 1968-2012 1968-2012
Real GDP per capita growth 1968-2012 1970-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012
General government final
consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012
Government budget deficit (% of GDP) 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012
Tax (% of GDP) 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012
Government Debt (% of GDP) 1990-2012 1990-2012 1984-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Real per capita government spending
on public health 1995-2012 1995-2012 1995-2012 1995-2012 1995-2012
Unemployment rate 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012
Fertility rate 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012 1968-2012
Alcohol consumption 1968-2011 1968-2011 1968-2009 1968-2007 1968-2009
Divorce rate 1968-2009 1997-2011 1971-2010 1968-2012 1981-2011
Labour market institution indicators 1968-2011 1968-2011 1968-2011 1968-2011 1968-2011
A snapshot of the suicide series is presented in Table A.2. Panel A of Table A.2 reveals
that the number of overall suicides between 2009 and 2012 (and 2011 for Italy) have increased
by 30% (from 391 to 508) in Greece, by 4.56% (from 3971 to 4152) in Italy, by 4% (from 1025
to 1066) in Portugal, by 3.21% (from 3429 to 3539) in Spain, and declined by 3.8% (from 527
to 507) in Ireland. Similar changes have also been experienced by male and female suicides.
Worryingly, since 2009, the number and rate of suicides are, in general, above their 1968-2012
average values. Selected years for the suicide rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) series reported in
Panel B of Table A.2, reveal similar trends as those for the number of suicides in Panel A of the
7http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm.
8http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN.
9http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics.
10http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/alcohol-consumption_
alcoholcons-table-en.
11http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics.
12employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm#data and www.oecd.org/els/soc/GRR_EN.
xlsx.
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same table.
Table A.3 presents suicide rates by time, 5-year age groups and by sex, for a selection of
years. According to this table, there is also clear evidence that suicide rates increase with age
and that males are more prone to commit suicide than females are, and which are in line with
the theoretical justications of Hamermesh and Soss (1974) and Durkheim (1897).
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